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ABSTRACT 
Despite numerous attempts to subject the use of pretext law enforcement 
stops to Alaska Constitutional scrutiny, the issue has never been thoroughly 
reviewed. Alaska courts currently allow pretext investigative stops so long as 
a reasonable officer following permissible police practices could have made the 
stop for the proffered reason. This is a minority position, inconsistent with 
federal law which deems pretext motivations constitutionally irrelevant. It is 
also far less protective of individual rights than an outright ban on officer 
pretext. This reasonable officer standard, however, offers some advantages 
over banning all types of pretext. This Article explores Alaska’s historical 
treatment of pretext justifications, discusses why pretext is prominent in 
police work, documents some of the leading arguments against pretext, and 
frames the issue in light of an opportunity to balance competing policy 
concerns. After considering precedent, reason, and policy, the authors urge 
the Court of Appeals to continue use of the reasonable officer standard, 
because it strikes the best balance between governmental, societal, and 
individual concerns. Nevertheless, the Article argues that the standard should 
be refined and suggests a workable test for determining when pretext stops 
are outside acceptable police practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most pressing legal issues facing the nation is the belief 
that officers engage in racial profiling through the use of the pretext 
stop.1 If the controversy surrounding Arizona’s 2010 legislative attempts 
to curb illegal immigration demonstrated anything, it is the prevalence 
of the perception that police target minority racial and ethnic groups. 
Despite provisions in Arizona Senate Bill 1070 that expressly banned 
targeting individuals solely on the basis of their apparent ancestry,2 
many believed the new legislation shielded profiling from review and 
even encouraged it.3 Perhaps their fears were justified. Recently, the 
Southern District of New York ruled that the New York Police 
Department’s “Stop and Frisk” policy allows officers to racially 
 
 1.  See Michael L. Birzer & Gwynne Harris Birzer, Race Matters: A Critical 
Look at Racial Profiling, It’s a Matter for the Courts, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 643, 643 (2006) 
(noting the United States Commission on Civil Rights’ (2000) declaration that 
racial profiling remains the highest priority, recommending legislation to 
prosecute violators, and increasing efforts to rid policing of this practice); see also 
Ending Racial Profiling in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Anthony D. Romero, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties 
Union) [hereinafter Ending Racial Profiling Hearing] (detailing the ongoing 
presence of racial profiling in America and urging the passage of the End Racial 
Profiling Act of 2011). 
 2.  Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (“For any lawful stop, detention or arrest 
made by a law enforcement official . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that 
the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States, a 
reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the 
immigration status of the person. . . . A law enforcement official . . . may not 
consider race, color or national origin in implementing the requirements of this 
subsection except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona 
Constitution.”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Christina Boomer, State Law Professor Claims S.B. 1070 ‘Expressly 
Authorizes Racial Profiling,’ ABC15.COM (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/state/state-law-professor-claims-sb1070-
%27expressly-authorizes-racial-profiling%27 (discussing University of Arizona 
law professor Gabriel Jackson Chin’s belief that the bill “doesn’t just create a 
probability of racial profiling, but authorizes it”). See also Gerry Harrington, 
Holder: DOJ to Ensure No Ariz. Profiling, UPI (July 8, 2012, 1:21 AM), 
http://www.policeone.com/border-patrol/articles/5816235-Holder-DOJ-to-
ensure-no-Ariz-profiling. Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the nation’s 
largest Hispanic citizens’ organization La Razza and said he remained “seriously 
concerned” by the potential impact of the Supreme Court’s decision to let a key 
provision of S.B. 1070 stand that instructs police to check the immigration status 
of those lawfully detained if they have reasonable suspicion they are illegal 
immigrants. Id. He stated, “[w]e’ll work to ensure, as the court affirmed, that 
such laws cannot be seen as a license to engage in racial profiling.” Id. 
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stereotype the individuals they stop and frisk.4 The controversies 
surrounding these policies in Arizona and New York call attention to a 
widespread belief that law enforcement officers do not equally enforce 
the laws of the land on all groups of citizens.5 For many commentators, 
pretext stops are one of the primary ways in which police engage in 
discriminatory enforcement of the law.  
Pretext stops occur when police officers temporarily detain an 
individual for particular reasons, but then use that stop to search or 
question him in relation to offenses for which the officers have neither 
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause. These stops are “pretextual” in 
the sense that the purported reason for the stop is not the real reason for 
which the officers are acting.6 Using pretext legal justifications is a 
common and efficient tool that allows officers to engage in 
investigations that they would not otherwise be justified in performing.7  
 
 4.  See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, 
at *73–74 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (“Whether through the use of a facially 
neutral policy applied in a discriminatory manner, or through express racial 
profiling, targeting young black and Hispanic men for stops based on the 
alleged criminal conduct of other young black or Hispanic men violates bedrock 
principles of equality.”); see also Joseph Goldstein, Recording Points to Race Factor 
in Stops by New York Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/nyregion/bronx-officers-recording-
suggests-race-is-factor-in-stops.html?%20Joseph (describing recent efforts to 
prove the existence of a policy and practice of racial profiling in New York 
through a class action suit against the city, the police department, and others). 
Numerous amicus briefs were filed arguing that racial profiling continues to 
exist and fosters a culture of racial hostility. Id. This Article primarily addresses 
traffic-related pretext stops, but not “Stop-and-Frisk” type policies, such as those 
adopted by the NYPD. Alaska’s cold temperatures make traffic encounters a 
frequent source of pretext in its case law. 
 5.  See, e.g., Laura W. Murphy, Time for Obama and Holder to Truly End Racial 
Profiling by Law Enforcement, ACLU (Dec. 21, 2012, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/time-obama-and-holder-truly-end-
racial-profiling-law-enforcement (arguing that the Obama administration’s 
failure to revise Justice Department policies permits the continued use of racial 
profiling and stereotyping by federal law enforcement agencies); Ending Racial 
Profiling Hearing, supra note 1 (detailing the ongoing presence of racial profiling 
in America and urging the passage of the End Racial Profiling Act of 2011); I. 
Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the 
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011) (citation omitted). 
 6.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1990) (defining pretext as the 
“ostensible reason or motive assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real 
reason or motive; false appearance, pretense”). As Shardul Desai explains, 
“applied to searches and seizures, pretext occurs when police use legal 
justifications to make stops or conduct searches for unrelated crimes for which 
they do not have the independent reasonable suspicion necessary to support the 
stop.” Shardul Desai, Pretextual Searches and Seizures: Alaska’s Failure to Adopt a 
Standard, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 235, 236 (Dec. 2006) (citation omitted). 
 7.  See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and 
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For example, an officer who wants to question a driver about an 
unrelated crime can use stopping the driver for a minor traffic violation 
as a pretext for asking about the other crime.8 Similarly, an officer who 
stops and frisks persons during street encounters is sometimes using 
those stops as pretexts for investigating other crimes.9 While some 
believe these pretextual stops are a useful law enforcement tool,10 others 
argue that pretext violates constitutional standards for intrusion into the 
affairs of citizens11 and shields race-based policing from discovery.12  
Alaska has not yet confronted the issue of pretext stops in the same 
public, controversial manner in which Arizona and New York City have. 
Nevertheless, this Article recommends a proactive consideration of this 
issue in order to highlight legal alternatives to the practice and avoid 
any appearance of providing “legal cover” for discriminatory conduct. 
Toward this end, we examine pretext stops from three perspectives: 
precedent, reason, and policy. 
This Article highlights the need for Alaska to avoid following 
precedent that has not been thoroughly explained or deemed 
constitutional. Toward this end, it examines the development of Alaska 
law on pretext investigations in the light of how courts in other states 
have addressed the issue. The Article also seeks to enrich the discussion 
by adding a law enforcement perspective to what has largely been a 
 
Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey 
Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725, 726–27 (2000) (discussing the use of 
pretext stops for traffic violations when police officers are “in fact motivated by 
the desire to obtain evidence of other crimes”); see also Desai, supra note 6, at 236 
(outlining common motivations for the use of pretext). 
 8.  Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7. 
 9.  See Goldstein, supra note 4 (discussing the use of pretext in the NYPD’s 
stop and frisk policy). 
 10.  Richard Cohen, The Invasive Police Strategy that Pacified New York City, 
WASH. POST (May 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/did-
new-york-citys-stop-and-frisk-save-5600-lives/2012/05/14/gIQAUv2kPU_story 
.html (discussing the way Mayor Bloomberg, of New York City, defends stop 
and frisk procedures). 
 11.  See, e.g., Ladson v. State, 979 P.2d 833, 838–42 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) 
(noting that pretext allows officers to circumvent the generally accepted rule that 
police seizures must be reasonable, which requires a warrant or a warrant 
exception); State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that 
“pretextual traffic stops are not constitutionally reasonable”). 
 12.  See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 726 (“[T]he Whren Court 
validated one of the most common methods by which racial profiles are put into 
effect—the pretext stop.”); Capers, supra note 5, at 12 (“Here, the fact that our 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence now fosters an atmosphere in which 
racial profiling is often unremarkable and juridically tolerated, and in which 
racial minorities perceive themselves to be second-class citizens, evidences the 
current Court’s retreat from concerns about equality and citizenship.”); Birzer & 
Birzer, supra note 1, at 648 (critiquing continued allowance of pretext stops). 
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discussion amongst lawyers. This added perspective emphasizes why 
pretext justifications are prevalent in police work and how external 
influences on officers ensure their continued use. We encourage Alaska 
to adopt a standard that allows some unavoidable and beneficial forms 
of pretext while protecting against illegitimate forms such as racial 
profiling. Such a policy is grounded in reason and reality, while 
addressing the fears of many minorities regarding the dangers of 
pretext. If applied correctly, the reasonable officer standard is such a 
standard.  
However, Alaska courts employ the reasonable officer standard 
differently than other jurisdictions.13 Alaska courts use it to define 
whether pretext motivations exist.14 Other jurisdictions acknowledge 
from the outset that pretext is present, and instead use the standard to 
decide whether the pretext will be permitted.15 Alaska’s current 
application of the standard is problematic because it does not 
adequately address whether an officer’s primary actual reason(s) for the 
stop are such that they eclipse the relevance of whether a reasonable 
officer would have acted on the observed infractions alone. For example, 
sometimes an officer’s actual reasons are so illegitimate that the question 
of whether a reasonable officer might have done something similar is 
rendered moot. Alaska courts need to articulate a workable test for 
determining when police actions driven by a complex mixture of 
pretextual and other reasons are, on the whole, consistent with 
reasonable police practice or not. 
Section One discusses legal standards governing pretext 
motivations and shows that Alaska courts have been reluctant to 
address whether pretext stops are allowed under the Alaska 
Constitution. This review of Alaska’s legal precedents highlights the 
inherent conflict, analyzed in Section Four, between the high value 
society places on individual autonomy and freedom from government 
intrusion, and the similarly high value it places on public safety and 
social responsibility. Alaska courts often decide cases involving these 
competing values in favor of the former.16 
 
 13.  See infra discussion Part I. 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734–36 (Alaska 1979) (imposing 
greater limitations on jailhouse booking searches than the federal courts because 
of greater protections of the Alaska Constitution); State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 
416 (Alaska 1979) (limiting the permissible scope of inventory searches of 
vehicles beyond what is required by the Fourth Amendment); State v. Glass, 583 
P.2d 872, 878–80 (Alaska 1978) (refusing to follow federal law allowing the 
surreptitious and warrantless recording of conversations); Ellison v. State, 383 
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This preference for individual autonomy closely relates to 
arguments presented in Section Two, which examines how law 
enforcement (including the legislative branch, the executive branch, and 
various levels of law enforcement bureaucracy) balances concerns for 
individual autonomy and public safety. Police officers, in particular, are 
often forced to use creative strategies that attempt to bridge the gap 
between the demand to protect the public and the strict procedural 
requirements imposed by the courts. This fact places courts in the 
position of deciding when an officer’s use of pretext is a reasonable 
police practice because it effectively balances competing interests. 
Recognizing that this balancing of interests is an unavoidable aspect of 
police work, courts should adopt a standard that allows for reasonable 
uses of pretext, but imposes sufficient constraints to allow them to 
adjudicate effectively cases where pretext stops were truly 
discriminatory.  
Section Three examines the arguments against allowing pretext 
stops.  While most jurisdictions allow pretext stops,17 there is a large 
body of literature criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. 
United States,18 which allowed pretext stops, and an even larger body of 
research suggesting that racial profiling occurs under the guise of these 
stops.19 This section highlights the two most prominent arguments 
against allowing pretext stops and demonstrates the need for Alaska to 
place some limits on its use.  
Section Four argues that courts will be able to devise an adequate 
approach to pretext stops if they examine the issue in the light of 
precedent, reason, and public policy. In light of this precedent, we 
encourage Alaska to adopt a holistic rule for pretext stops based on 
reason and policy rather than precedent alone. Such an approach offers 
 
P.2d 716, 718–20 (Alaska 1963) (reasoning that automobiles are protected by a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from warrantless searches because the Alaska 
Constitution protects “other property”). Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 
49 (1970) (allowing the warrantless search of a vehicle in part because of the 
reduced expectations of privacy people have in their automobiles). 
 17.  See People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 & n.1 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that more than 40 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
federal objective standard, and only one state has refused to adopt the federal 
standard on state constitutional grounds); see also Abramovsky & Edelstein, 
supra note 7, at 733 & n.60, 738 & n.98 (noting that the only state high court to 
reject Whren is the Washington Supreme Court and cataloguing a list of 
jurisdictions that have adopted Whren’s objective standard). But note that New 
Mexico has also recently declined to follow Whren. See State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 
143, 151–55 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting as unconstitutional the use of 
pretextual stops). 
 18.  517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 19.  See Goldstein, supra note 4. See also infra discussion Parts II and III. 
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the best chance of adequately addressing competing concerns raised in 
this contentious debate. 
The final section provides recommendations for analyzing pretext 
stops that balance precedent, reason, and policy and conform to 
constitutional standards. We present these recommendations as a path 
toward devising an alternative to the Alaska Court of Appeals’ use of 
the reasonable officer standard articulated in Nease v. State.20 Our 
alternative approach does not reject this standard outright, but 
recommends a different way of understanding it. We believe it is time 
for the court to survey the landscape and see if this is the appropriate 
standard. If it is, the court needs to elaborate and defend it. We offer a 
way in which this might be done.  
I. LEGAL PRECEDENT GOVERNING PRETEXT STOPS 
Three legal standards have emerged to govern the permissibility of 
pretext stops by law enforcement officers. Varying by jurisdiction, courts 
have applied either a subjective, objective, or hybrid reasonable officer 
standard.21 The objective standard makes an officer’s subjective 
motivations immaterial. Using this standard, a court examines whether 
there was some legal justification which could have allowed the stop or 
search to occur.22 Under this standard, pretext motivations are 
permissible in that they do not affect the legality of the stop so long as a 
separate and lawful reason for the stop or search exists.23  
Courts employing the subjective standard focus on the officer’s true 
motivation to stop and investigate.24 If the officer’s actual motivation 
lacks a lawful justification for a stop, the subsequent search is 
unconstitutional.25 Under this standard, all pretext stops are unlawful.26  
The reasonable officer standard requires courts to follow a more 
 
 20.  105 P.3d 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 21.  See Desai, supra note 6, at 243–46 (discussing the nuances of these three 
standards). 
 22.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (rejecting the notion 
that the constitutionality of traffic stops could turn on the subjective motivations 
of individual officers). 
 23.  See, e.g., id. at 812–13 (1996) (reasoning that lawful conduct by officers 
will not be rendered invalid simply on the basis of ulterior motives). 
 24.  See Ladson v. State, 979 P.2d 833, 843 (Wash. 1999) (“when determining 
whether a given stop is pretextual, the court should consider the totality of the 
circumstances, including . . . the subjective intent of the officer”). 
 25.  See id. at 842 (holding that pretext stops violate Washington’s 
constitution). 
 26.  See, e.g., Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837–42; People v. Dickson, 690 N.Y.S.2d 394, 
396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (maintaining that pretextual stops are prohibited in 
New York). 
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stringent version of the objective approach by allowing officers to 
entertain pretext motivations, but only to the extent that the stop could 
have occurred under established police practice.27 
A. The Federal Objective Standard for Pretext Stops 
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court created a bright-line rule 
allowing pretext traffic stops by a unanimous decision in Whren v. 
United States.28 According to the Whren court, traffic stops are valid 
regardless of the subjective motivations of the investigating officers, so 
long as there is probable cause that some traffic violation has occurred 
which would allow a stop for that violation.29 This is the objective 
standard referred to above. 
In Whren, undercover narcotics detectives were patrolling a known 
drug area when they noticed a suspicious vehicle driven by two young 
black males they believed might be carrying drugs.30 The vehicle was 
stopped at a stop sign for an unusually long period, had temporary 
plates, and the driver was seen looking at the lap of the passenger.31 
When the police turned around, the truck turned without signaling and 
sped off.32 The officers pulled over the vehicle based on this observed 
traffic violation, and when they approached the car they saw two bags 
of crack cocaine in Whren’s hands, for which he was later prosecuted.33 
Whren argued that the stop for the observed traffic violations was 
merely a pretext to investigate the vehicle for drug dealing, for which 
the officers lacked independent evidence needed to stop and 
investigate.34 He contended that this stop was merely pretextual and 
 
 27.  See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(“[C]ourts should inquire whether a reasonable officer ‘would have’ made the 
stop anyway, apart from his suspicions about other more serious criminal 
activity.”); Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he fact 
that a police officer may have an ulterior motive for enforcing the law is 
irrelevant . . . unless . . . this ulterior motive prompted the officer to depart from 
reasonable police practice.”). 
 28.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
 29.  See id. Whren did not expressly extend this to investigatory traffic stops 
based on just reasonable suspicion, but logic suggests the same rule would 
apply. 
 30.  Id. at 808. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 808–09. It was not argued that this stop was based on any 
suspicions raised by the officer’s observations. The stop was argued permissible 
based on the observed traffic violations. Id. 
 34.  Id. at 809. 
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thus unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment grounds.35 Whren argued 
that the extent of automobile regulations renders it nearly impossible to 
comply with all traffic and safety rules. This creates a situation where 
officers will almost “invariably be able to catch any given motorist on a 
technical violation.”36 He argued that permitting pretext stops based 
only on probable cause of the observed traffic violation would create the 
temptation to inappropriately use traffic stops as a means of 
investigating other violations for which there was no probable cause or 
articulable suspicion.37 He claimed that this could lead to stops based on 
impermissible factors, such as race.38  
Whren advocated for a rule that would only allow such a stop if a 
police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the 
reason given.39 He argued it was unreasonable for plain clothes vice 
officers in an unmarked car to enforce this minor traffic violation when 
police regulations only permitted such vehicles to enforce traffic laws if 
the violation was grave enough to pose an immediate safety threat to 
others.40 
The Supreme Court noted it had previously prohibited the use of 
pretext investigative agendas in the context of inventory searches41 and 
administrative searches,42 but emphasized the limited breadth of those 
holdings. The Court distinguished these rulings from the facts of the 
Whren case, as they addressed only “the validity of a search conducted 
in the absence of probable cause” in the context of inventory and 
administrative searches.43 In contrast, Whren was a passenger in a 
vehicle observed violating a traffic law.44 According to the Court, when 
courts find pretext motivations prohibited, the Court did not intend to 
endorse the idea that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct 
justified by probable cause. 
By contrast when probable cause of a violation existed, the Court 
held that the subjective intentions of officers had no bearing on Fourth 
Amendment analysis.45 Indeed, the Court had a track record of not 
 
 35.  Id. at 810. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. This standard is referred to as the “reasonable officer standard.” 
 40.  Id. at 815. 
 41.  Id. at 811 (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) and Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)). 
 42.  Id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716–17 & n.27 (1987)). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 808, 812–13. In United States v. Villamonte–Marquez, the Court held 
that an otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs agents was 
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looking at the subjective intent of officers in both Fourth46 and Fifth47 
Amendment cases where other circumstances create an opportunity for 
legal action. For example, in New York v. Quarles, the United States 
Supreme Court created the public safety exception to the Miranda 
warning requirement and held this exception was available regardless of 
the subjective motivations of the officers at the time the exception 
applied.48  
In Whren, the Court refused to apply a “reasonable officer 
standard.”49 This standard, adopted at that time by the Ninth and 
 
not invalid “because the Customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana 
State Policeman, and were following an informant’s tip that a vessel in the ship 
channel was thought to be carrying marijuana.” 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983). The 
Court dismissed any idea that an ulterior motive might serve to remove the 
agents’ legal justification for their actions. Id. at 588. In United States v. Robinson, 
the Court held that a traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid 
because it was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search,” and that a lawful post-
arrest search of the person would not be invalid by the fact that it was not 
motivated by the officer-safety concern that justifies such searches. 414 U.S. 218, 
221 n.1 (1973). See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973) (observing 
that the lawfulness of a search does not turn on the presence of an evidentiary 
purpose). In Scott v. United States, the Court rejected the argument that wiretap 
evidence should be excluded because the agents controlling the tap failed to 
make any effort to comply with the statutory requirement that unauthorized 
acquisitions be minimized. 436 U.S. 128, 136–38 (1978). In response the Court 
said “[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal 
or unconstitutional.” Id. at 136. According to Robinson, “the fact that the officer 
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which 
provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the 
action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that 
action.” Id. at 138. 
 46.  Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006). 
 47.  New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). 
 48.  Id. (“On these facts there is a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement 
that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted 
into evidence, and the availability of that exception does not depend upon the 
motivation of the individual officers involved. . . . Undoubtedly most police 
officers, if placed in Officer Kraft’s position, would act out of a host of different, 
instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives—their own safety, the safety of 
others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the 
suspect.”) 
 49.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 814–15 (citation omitted) (“Instead of asking whether 
the individual officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have 
us ask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to 
believe that the officer had the proper state of mind. . . . Indeed, it seems to us 
somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb 
the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a 
‘reasonable officer’ would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation. 
While police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provide 
objective assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the 
hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable—an exercise that might be 
called virtual subjectivity. Moreover, police enforcement practices, even if they 
MAY_V14_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2013 2:03 PM 
2013 PRETEXT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 161 
Eleventh Circuits, did not expressly look at officer motivation, but rather 
focused on whether the officer had acted outside of what reasonable 
officers following normal police procedures would have done once the 
traffic violation was observed.50 Under this approach, if the police action 
was deemed to be taken in good faith and within the scope of reasonable 
police practice, then it is not pretextual. If it was not so taken, then it is 
considered an unlawful form of pretext.51 
Given the speculative nature of ascertaining underlying 
motivations as well as the degree to which police standards vary across 
jurisdictions, the Court was hesitant to adopt the reasonable officer 
standard.52 Such a standard would vary widely across the rules of 
different jurisdictions and involve judicial speculation about the 
hypothetical motives of a hypothetical officer—”an exercise that might 
be called virtual subjectivity.”53 
Instead, the Court adopted the purely objective, bright-line 
approach that pretext searches and seizures are valid so long as there is 
probable cause of some violation that could justify the initial stop.54 The 
logic of the Whren decision lays the foundation for extending the 
objective standard to investigative traffic stops when based on an 
articulated suspicion of a violation, as these temporary investigative 
detentions are considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.55  
One author has summarized the two standards discussed in Whren 
 
could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and from time 
to time. We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth 
Amendment are so variable . . . .”). 
 50.  See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding 
that “in determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the 
proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in 
the absence of the illegitimate motivation”); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 
472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a search is valid “even if the searching officer 
had an investigatory motive, as long as the officer would have conducted the 
search in question anyway pursuant to police inventory practices”). 
 51.  See Smith, 799 F.2d at 708 (finding officer’s “hunch” was not a lawful 
form of pretext and declining to uphold the stop); Cannon, 29 F.3d at 476 (finding 
stopping a car because the driver was driving with a suspended license was 
lawful). 
 52.  Whren, 517 U.S. at 814–15. For example, in this particular case, Whren 
argued that a reasonable officer would not have made this stop because police 
regulations permit undercover officers to enforce traffic laws “only in the case of 
a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.” 
Id. at 815 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
 53.  Id. at 815. 
 54.  Id. at 818–19. 
 55.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (discussing the determination of 
reasonableness in police searches). 
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by calling the objective standard the “could test” and the reasonable 
officer standard the “would test.”56 The objective standard allows the 
court to support officers’ actions if, given the facts and circumstances, an 
officer could lawfully perform the contested action, notwithstanding 
having a pretext motive. The reasonable officer standard only protects 
those actions where the facts and circumstances would lead reasonable 
officers to act, despite having other pretext motives as well.  
B. Refusing to Follow Whren: The Subjective and Reasonable 
Officer Standards 
While most states have adopted the objective approach announced 
in Whren,57 several states have refused to follow that trend based on 
their own state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.58 In Ladson v. State,59 the Washington Supreme Court held 
that pretext traffic stops violate Article I, Section 7 of the Washington 
Constitution.  
In Ladson, officers on gang patrol noticed a vehicle driven by 
Richard Fogle with a passenger, Thomas Ladson.60 The officers had 
heard rumors that Fogle was involved with drugs.61 Based on this 
suspicion, and the desire to investigate further, the officers tailed Fogle’s 
vehicle looking for a legal justification to stop the car.62 After some time, 
the officers pulled over the vehicle on the grounds that the license plates 
had expired.63 When it was discovered that Fogle was driving on a 
suspended driver’s license, they arrested him, ordered Ladson out of the 
car, and performed a full search incident to arrest of the passenger 
compartment.64 Inside Ladson’s coat, which was lying on the passenger 
seat, the officers found a pistol, marijuana, and $600 cash. 65 Ladson was 
charged with possession of a stolen firearm and drug possession with 
intent to distribute.66 
 
 56.  Celia G. Gamrath, The Law of Pretext Stops Since Whren v. United States, 
85 ILL. B.J. 488, 489 (1997). 
 57.  See sources cited supra note 17. 
 58.  See Ladson v. State, 979 P.2d 833, 842–43 (Wash. 1999) (en banc); State v. 
Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 402 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006); State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 151–
55 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt the Whren standard). 
 59.  979 P.2d at 842–43. 
 60.  Id. at 836. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
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Ladson moved to suppress the evidence arguing it was obtained 
during an unconstitutional pretext traffic stop.67 The officers candidly 
admitted it was standard practice to look for traffic violations to enable 
them to investigate other crimes, and that the reason they followed and 
pulled over this vehicle was their desire to investigate other crimes.68 
The trial court suppressed the evidence and held that pretext stops by 
law enforcement officers violate the Washington Constitution.69 The 
State appealed in light of the recently decided Whren v. United States.70 
On appeal, Ladson argued that Article I, Section 7 of the 
Washington Constitution provides broader protection than the Fourth 
Amendment in the area of pretext stops and renders them 
unconstitutional.71 This provision reads “[n]o person shall be disturbed 
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”72 
The Washington court acknowledged that the essence of every pretext 
traffic stop is a situation where police pull over a citizen, not to enforce 
the traffic code, but rather to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated 
to the driving.73 The reasonable suspicion to investigate the unrelated 
crime is missing.74 Reviewing applicable state search and seizure 
standards, the court noted that even routine traffic stops are a seizure 
that must be reasonable, and that pretext stops do not fall within one of 
Washington’s “jealously and carefully drawn” exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.75 Washington’s constitutional search and seizure provision 
is designed to guard against “‘unreasonable search and seizure, made 
without probable cause.’”76 The Washington court believed pretext stops 
violated this standard. The Ladson majority stated: 
The problem with a pretextual traffic stop is that it is a search 
or seizure which cannot be constitutionally justified for its true 
reason (i.e., speculative criminal investigation), but only for 
some other reason (i.e., to enforce traffic code) which is at once 
lawfully sufficient but not the real reason. Pretext is therefore a 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 73.  Ladson, 979 P.2d at 836. 
 74.  Id. at 837–38. 
 75.  Id. (quoting State v. Hendrickson, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996)). Exceptions 
to the warrant requirement fall into several broad categories: consent, exigent 
circumstances, searches incident to arrest, inventory searches, plain view, and 
Terry investigative stops. Hendrickson, 917 P.2d at 568. 
 76.  Ladson, 979 P.2d at 838 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Fields, 530 
P.2d 284, 286 (Wash. 1975)). 
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triumph of form over substance; a triumph of expediency at the 
expense of reason. But it is against the standard of 
reasonableness which our constitution measures exceptions to 
the general rule, which forbids search or seizure absent a 
warrant. Pretext is result without reason.77 
Accordingly, the court refused to break from its historical disapproval of 
police pretext in Washington case law.78 
The Ladson dissent argued the search was not justified by the 
pretextual stop, but by the independent grounds discovered at the 
stop.79 The majority countered that such a conclusion presumes that the 
initial pretext stop was justified—the very question to be decided.80 The 
majority declined to follow Whren and held that Article I, Section 7 of the 
Washington Constitution forbids use of pretext as a justification for a 
warrantless search or seizure, but rather requires the court to look 
beyond the formal justification for the stop to the actual one.81 
Ultimately, in the case of pretext stops the actual reason for the stop will 
be inherently insufficient, otherwise the pretext motivation would have 
been unnecessary.82 Summarizing its holding, the court stated: 
Once again, warrants are the rule while exceptions are 
narrowly tailored to meet the reasonable necessity of the 
common law ground which provides the authority of law to 
dispense with the warrant requirement. Pretext is no substitute 
for reason. Thus, this and other pretextual inventory search 
cases prove the rule that recognized exceptions to the warrant 
 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 838–42. On multiple occasions, the Washington Supreme Court has 
held pretext searches and seizures are unlawful. See City of Seattle v. McCready, 
868 P.2d 134, 140 (Wash. 1994) (affirming that the government cannot disturb an 
individual’s private affairs without a legally valid warrant based upon probable 
cause); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775, 777 (Wash. 1988) (prohibiting 
pretext stops under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution, 
reasoning that such stops lack the articulable suspicion mandated in warrantless 
searches); State v. Michaels, 374 P.2d 989, 993–94 (Wash. 1962) (adopting a strict 
no-pretext rule where defendant was stopped and arrested for failing to use a 
turn signal and was searched incident to arrest). 
 79.  Ladson, 979 P.2d at 845. 
 80.  Id. at 839 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). “Such is the 
dissent’s ultimate dilemma: How [sic] can this court articulate an exception to 
the warrant requirement based upon reasonable necessity when the warrant is 
avoided, not for a reason which would justify the warrantless investigatory stop, 
but upon a pretext of form lacking connection to a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity which would justify the exception to the warrant 
requirement in the first place?” Id. at 838–39. 
 81.  Id. at 842. 
 82.  Id. 
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requirement are limited by the reason which called them into 
existence, not a pro forma device, as the dissent would have it, 
to undermine the “authority of law” warrant requirement 
enshrined in our state constitution.83 
Based on its constitution, Washington has decided it is an abuse of 
police discretion to conduct warrantless searches under the guise of 
recognized warrant exceptions if the reason for activating those 
exceptions is something other than one of the legitimate government 
interests necessary for deviation from the warrant standard in the first 
place.84 In other words, where the actual motivation for the stop or 
search does not match the reason for deviating from the general rule 
requiring probable cause and a warrant, the stop and search is then 
unreasonable under the Washington Constitution. As applied in the 
State of Washington, the subjective standard proscribes the use of 
pretext stops, and requires the court to ascertain the officer’s actual 
motivation. 
 Similarly, New Mexico has rejected Whren’s objective standard and 
moved toward the reasonable officer standard. In State v. Ochoa,85 an 
undercover drug detective was watching a suspected drug trafficking 
residence when he observed an unfamiliar vehicle.86 Wanting to search 
the vehicle, he observed the vehicle leaving the residence and he radioed 
a patrol officer to stop it because the driver was seen not wearing his 
seatbelt.87 After following the vehicle for thirteen blocks, but not 
personally witnessing the seatbelt violation, the patrol officer stopped 
the vehicle based on the reported observation of the drug detective.88 
The driver was arrested for having outstanding warrants, and when the 
drug detective arrived, he received consent to search the car and located 
some drugs and a gun.89 The driver moved to suppress this evidence as 
fruit of a pretext traffic stop in violation of the state constitution.90 
Specifically, he argued the state constitution provides a “distinctive, 
extra layer of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
involving automobiles that is unavailable at the federal level,” and this 
 
 83.  Id. at 841. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  206 P.3d 143 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). See also State v. Gonzales, 257 P.3d 
894, 896, 898–99 (N.M. 2011) (adopting the appellate court’s reasonable officer 
test in Ochoa and affirming that pretext stops are unconstitutional in New 
Mexico). 
 86.  Ochoa, 206 P.3d at 147. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
MAY_V14_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2013  2:03 PM 
166 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 30:2 
requires meaningful review of all evidence about the reasonableness of 
the officer’s conduct.91  
 The appellate court noted that there were many criticisms of 
Whren’s legal reasoning, policy choices, and consequences.92 After 
agreeing with these critiques of Whren, the court declined to adopt the 
objective test and held that pretextual traffic stops violate the New 
Mexico Constitution.93 Instead, the court adopted a reasonable officer 
standard, a test which rejects unreasonable pretext stops, 94 later 
described in detail in Section Four of this Article. This test defines 
“unreasonable” pretext stops as “purely pretext” stops.95 Applying this 
standard, the defendant was able to establish a presumption of unlawful 
pretext that the State was unable to rebut.96 
 Washington and New Mexico both refused to follow Whren by 
subjecting officer pretext to a more thorough judicial scrutiny. Each state 
has rejected police officers’ use of minor traffic violations to skirt state 
constitutional limits on police intrusion. Each of the cases discussed 
above provide good reasons for Alaska courts to consider when they 
address whether pretext searches are valid under its state constitution.  
C. Alaska’s Inconsistent Approach to Pretext 
Alaska courts have inconsistently applied the subjective, objective, 
and reasonable officer standards to pretext vehicle stops. Like other state 
and federal courts, the shift towards allowing pretext stops emerged 
during the 1980s and 1990s when the United States Supreme Court 
began to place greater emphasis on the need for crime control 
strategies.97 Originally, officer pretext was considered unlawful in 
 
 91.  Id. at 148. 
 92.  Id. at 148–49 (citing Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State 
Constitutional Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 
72 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 597 (1999); David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: A 
Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 96–109 
(1998); Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Towards a State Constitutional 
Check on Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment’s Outer Frontier: A 
Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1025 (1996)). 
 93.  Id. at 150–55. 
 94.  Id. at 155–56. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 156–57. 
 97.  See generally Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1630 (2006) (discussing the 
Rehnquist Court’s approach to constitutional criminal procedure). “The new 
revolution deals with what happens in court, not on the street; it is concerned 
with regulating lawyers and judges, not police officers; and, with a minor 
qualification, it is indifferent to—that is, treats as not a matter relevant to its 
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Alaska.98 Since 2005, the Alaska Court of Appeals has consistently 
applied the “reasonable officer standard.” However, the reason the court 
adopted this standard over alternatives is unclear. 
1. Pre–Whren Cases 
 
McCoy v. State99 is one of the earliest reported cases where the 
Alaska Supreme Court expressed its distaste for pretext legal 
justifications.100 McCoy defines the permissible circumstances for 
initiating a lawful search incident to arrest.101 The court condemned 
using an arrest for the pretext desire to search the individual or area in 
his immediate control for evidence of criminality.102 In McCoy, the court 
also limited these searches to a search for destructible or concealable 
evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made because this would 
remove the “danger of a pretext arrest.”103 
Brown v. State104 is another 1970s case addressing pretext issues, and 
perhaps the first involving a pretext traffic stop argument. In Brown, an 
officer responded to a reported burglary of a liquor store and saw a 
vehicle leaving the general area.105 The officer observed the vehicle make 
several traffic violations.106 The officer decided to stop the vehicle,107 
and, while he was pulling the car over, he received a description (of 
person, clothes, and weapon) of the robbery suspect from dispatch.108 
When Brown got out of the car, the officer saw that his description 
matched that of the robbery suspect.109 The officer ordered Brown to lie 
on the ground and as he approached Brown he looked into the car and 
saw a jacket and weapon inside that matched the dispatcher’s report.110 
 
concerns—the way the criminal justice system meshes with racial inequality in 
the United States.” Id. 
 98.  McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See id. at 138 (“The arrest must not be a pretext for the search; a search 
incident to a sham arrest is not valid.”). 
 101.  See id. (proffering a list of requirements for a valid search). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 139. 
 104.  580 P.2d 1174 (Alaska 1978). 
 105.  Id. at 1175. 
 106.  Id. The officer noticed the vehicle bouncing erratically, which led him to 
believe the vehicle was speeding. Id. The officer also observed the vehicle 
turning without stopping at the intersection or signaling. Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
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Brown was arrested, convicted, and then appealed.111 He argued 
the evidence used to convict him was obtained through an unlawful 
pretext traffic stop.112 The Alaska Supreme Court stated that, while “[i]t 
[was] true that an arrest (or a traffic stop) should not be used as a pretext 
for a search,” there was substantial evidence to show that Brown’s 
vehicle was stopped for the observed traffic violations and was not a 
pretext stop.113 There was no evidence in the record that the officer 
harbored a subjective intent that differed from his stated reasons for the 
stop,114 and nothing suggested that he had fabricated the traffic 
observations he relied upon as the reasoning for the stop.115 
In Brown, the court never clearly announced the specific standard it 
was using to evaluate this pretext claim. But, by expressly condemning 
pretext traffic stops and commenting on the lack of any evidence in the 
record to suggest the officer had ulterior motives for this vehicle stop,116 
it appeared that the court applied the subjective standard.  
The court of appeals relied upon Brown ten years later in Townsel v. 
State,117 which involved another alleged pretext traffic stop.118 Like 
Brown, this case involved a robbery where the defendant argued a traffic 
stop was used as a pretext to search for evidence of the robbery,119 and 
again the court focused on the officer’s subjective motivations for the 
stop.120 In Townsel, an Anchorage officer responded to a liquor store 
robbery.121 Upon arrival, the officer contacted the victim who described 
the suspect as a “juvenile black male between the ages of 16-20, 
approximately 5’6”-5’7” and 130-140 pounds with black hair and brown 
eyes” and that the suspect had fled the area on foot carrying a rifle.122 
Another officer on duty near the area overheard the dispatch call and 
 
 111.  Id. at 1176. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Experience and common police practice suggest otherwise. However, 
without this type of testimony in the record it was impossible to determine that 
this was a pretext stop without making an unsupported inference from the 
proximity of the burglary report and the traffic stop. 
 115.  Brown, 580 P.2d at 1176. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  763 P.2d 1353 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
 118.  Id. at 1354–55. 
 119.  Id. at 1355. 
 120.  See id. (“Officer Rochford testified that he stopped the vehicle for the 
traffic and vehicular infractions, not on a pretext to enable him to investigate the 
robbery. He testified that he would have made this stop under normal 
conditions if he was not investigating the robbery.”). 
 121.  Id. at 1354. 
 122.  Id. 
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observed a vehicle driving near that area.123 The officer observed several 
vehicle violations including speeding, missing headlight, and a cracked 
tail light lens.124 Based on these vehicle infractions, the officer stopped 
the vehicle and ordered the driver out of the car.125 As the driver was 
exiting the car, the officer observed the muzzle of a rifle in the back seat, 
drew his duty weapon, and ordered the driver not to touch it.126 At that 
point the driver grabbed the rifle, threw it to the ground, and ran from 
the scene.127 The suspect escaped, but subsequent search warrants for 
the suspect’s car and home led to his arrest and conviction for the 
robbery of the liquor store.128 
Arguing that the evidence brought against him was obtained as the 
result of a traffic stop that was used as a pretext for a search, the 
defendant cited Brown v. State as the leading Alaska case to condemn 
pretext stops.129 The newly established Alaska Court of Appeals 
addressed this argument by noting that, while Brown does establish that 
“‘an arrest (or a traffic stop) should not be used as a pretext for a 
search,’” it also supports the idea that “where ‘there is substantial 
evidence to support the trial court’s determination that [the defendant’s] 
vehicle was stopped for a violation of traffic regulations and that [the 
stop] was not a pretext stop’ then the stop was not illegal.”130 Here, the 
officer testified that he stopped the vehicle for the traffic and vehicular 
infractions, not on a pretext to enable him to investigate the robbery.131 
Further, he testified that he would have made this stop under normal 
conditions if he was not investigating the robbery,132 which would 
justify his stop under the subjective test. Based on this testimony, which 
the trial court found to be credible, the Alaska Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction because this was not a situation involving 
pretext.133 
At this point in the development of Alaska case law, however, 
change was on the horizon regarding the impact of subjective intentions 
on the legality of pretext traffic stops. In 1992, the Alaska Court of 
 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 1355. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 
(Alaska 1978)). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. Again, common sense and the proximity of the dispatch call and this 
traffic stop suggests otherwise. 
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Appeals discussed the effect of an officer’s subjective intentions for 
making an investigative stop in dicta in the case of Beauvois v. State.134 
The defendant robbed a convenience store in Fairbanks and fled on foot 
towards a campground.135 The store clerk alerted the authorities, and a 
responding officer decided to check the nearby campground.136 The 
officer observed a car leaving the campground, and stopped the 
vehicle.137 One passenger, who matched the description of the robber, 
alighted from the vehicle.138 A license plate check also indicated the 
vehicle was reported stolen, and a check of the driver’s identity 
indicated she had been reported missing.139 A third person was found 
hiding under a blanket in the backseat.140 The store clerk reported to the 
scene and confirmed that the man in the back seat, Beauvois, was the 
person who had just robbed the store.141 
At an evidentiary hearing, Beauvois argued the stop of the car 
violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska 
Constitution because there was not a sufficient legal justification for this 
investigatory stop.142 The trial judge denied the defendants’ Motion to 
Suppress, holding that under the facts of this case it was permissible to 
stop any potential witnesses found in this particular area. The court of 
appeals agreed.143 But, instead of stopping at the holding, the court also 
stated that the officer’s subjective motivation for the stop would be 
irrelevant because under these facts the officer could have objectively 
stopped vehicles in this area for the purpose of identifying potential 
witnesses.144  
This case demonstrates that the Alaska Court of Appeals was 
willing to adopt an objective standard for pretext stops as early as 1992. 
At this point in time, the United States Supreme Court had not 
definitively announced whether such a standard was permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment.  
 
 134.  837 P.2d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). 
 135.  Id. at 1119–20. 
 136.  Id. at 1120. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 1121–22. 
 144.  Id. at 1121 n.1. At an evidentiary hearing the officer admitted his intent 
was to stop the car to check for the robbery suspect and not to conduct a 
witness-type inquiry. However, the court of appeals stated “[the officer’s] 
subjective intent when he stopped the car is irrelevant. The test is whether, 
under the facts known to the police officer, the stop of the car was objectively 
justified.” Id. 
MAY_V14_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2013 2:03 PM 
2013 PRETEXT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 171 
The Alaska Court of Appeals next addressed pretext traffic stops in 
Combs v. Anchorage145 in 1994. While this case is an unpublished opinion 
with no precedential effect, it is still instructive regarding the appellate 
court’s approach to these cases during this era.146  
In Combs, the defendant pled no contest to driving while 
intoxicated and on a revoked license, but reserved the right to appeal the 
legality of the initial traffic stop which he asserted was based on 
pretext.147 In this case police received a report that a woman was seen 
being thrown from a vehicle in the parking lot of a grocery store.148 The 
report included a description of the vehicle, license plate number, and 
description of the vehicle’s occupants and the victim.149 The responding 
officer found no one in the area matching the descriptions.150 Forty 
minutes later, another officer, who had heard the earlier dispatch report, 
saw a car matching that description try to make a U-turn on a business 
district roadway in that same general area.151 The vehicle had to back up 
to complete the turn, which caused the officer to apply his brakes and 
allow the vehicle to move out of the way.152 The officer saw that the 
license plate number matched that of the report.153 The officer followed 
the car for about half a mile before stopping it.154 The officer discovered 
the driver, Combs, was intoxicated and arrested him.155 
The trial judge found that the officer had observed Combs commit 
two traffic violations, but that the primary motivation for this stop was 
to investigate the earlier reported assault.156 Despite these findings the 
trial judge concluded that an officer probably would have stopped a 
vehicle attempting an illegal U-turn directly in front of him even in the 
absence of the earlier dispatch report.157 Therefore, the stop was upheld 
as valid.158 
On appeal, Combs argued that the stop was illegal pretext based on 
the judge’s findings that (a) the traffic violations were not the actual 
 
 145.  No. A-5157, 1994 WL 16196676, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1994). 
 146.  Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See 
ALASKA R. APP. P. 214(d). 
 147.  Combs, 1994 WL 16196676, at *1–2. 
 148.  Id. at *1. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
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motivation for the stop and (b) there was no reasonable suspicion to 
support the actual motivation for the stop.159 Combs referred the Court 
to two cases from other jurisdictions holding that a traffic stop will not 
be valid when made with an invalid motivation, unless a reasonable 
police officer would have made the stop for the observed traffic 
violation even without the invalid motivation.160 However, the court 
concluded that it did not need to decide whether or not to adopt this 
reasonable officer standard because even under that standard Combs’s 
stop would be legal given the trial court’s findings.161 The conviction 
was affirmed.162 
While not a reported case, Combs remains important, and we 
believe influential, in the court’s future approach to pretext traffic stops. 
Because the court did not choose to proactively adopt the reasonable 
officer standard, it suggests that, prior to this case, the reasonable officer 
standard did not govern pretext situations and that courts were still 
applying the subjective standard.163 This case might also explain what 
turned the focus of the court of appeals to other jurisdictions’ use of the 
reasonable officer standard—the defendant, Combs, may have argued 
for the reasonable officer standard because he was familiar with the 
dicta from the court of appeals just two years earlier which suggested a 
willingness to adopt a wholly objective standard, a standard most 
detrimental to defendants.  
2. Post-Whren Cases 
 
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Whren in 1996 the 
Alaska Court of Appeals has been presented with many pretext stop 
arguments. In Hamilton v. State,164 the court of appeals, in dicta, cited 
favorably the objective standard that had been applied by other courts 
pursuant to Whren.165 Three years later, in Nease v. State,166 the court 
went further and began to employ the reasonable officer standard.167 In 
 
 159.  Id. at *2. 
 160.  Id. Interestingly, the defendant did not need to argue precedent from 
other jurisdictions. See id. (holding that the question of what doctrine to adopt 
did not need to be decided at that time). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See id. (declining to adopt the reasonable officer standard because it 
would make no difference on the facts of this case). 
 164.  59 P.3d 760 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 165.  Id. at 904; Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 765–66. 
 166.  105 P.3d 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 167.  See id. at 1149 (“[T]he question is whether Officer Torok departed from 
reasonable police practice . . . .”). 
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doing so, the court of appeals offered no explanation for resorting to a 
standard that appears inconsistent with pre- and post-Whren Alaska case 
law. Yet, the reasonable officer standard used in Nease has been 
continuously followed up until the present time.168  
Hamilton involved a defendant who was convicted of murder and 
appealed his conviction by arguing that the evidence used in his 
conviction was derived from an unlawful pretext stop.169 A responding 
officer saw a sedan driving away from the area of a reported stabbing.170 
That officer radioed another officer to follow the car and record the 
license plate number for later questioning as a possible witness.171 The 
vehicle’s license plate was obscured by snow and could not be read, so 
the officer stopped the vehicle and approached it.172 After brushing off 
the snow and reporting the number to her superiors, the officer 
approached the driver’s window and observed Hamilton with bloody 
hands.173 Hamilton was arrested and the majority of the evidence 
presented at trial was located at that time.174 
Hamilton argued the obscured license plate was not the actual 
motivation for the stop, which made the stop an illegal pretext.175 The 
State offered two justifications for this stop.176 First, it was a violation of 
the traffic laws to have an obscured license plate, and the stop could be 
justified on that ground.177 Second, the stop was a permissible 
investigative stop to inquire whether the occupant was a witness to the 
reported crime.178 The court of appeals agreed with both of the 
prosecution’s arguments.179 Following its dicta in Beauvois, the court 
held that the legality of this investigative stop hinged on an “objective 
test: whether the facts known to the officers established a legitimate 
basis for the stop.”180 The court further stated that “the officers’ 
subjective theories as to why the stop was proper [were] irrelevant.”181 
 
 168.  Marley v. State, No. A–9285, 2006 WL 1195668, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. 
May 3, 2006); Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); 
Olson v. State, No. A–8595, 2005 WL 1683588, at *2–3 (Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 
2005). 
 169.  Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 764. 
 170.  Id. at 763. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 764. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 767. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 765. 
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Yet, the court of appeals declined to rule on the constitutionality of this 
standard, adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Whren, 
finding the stop was justified because the driver was a possible witness 
to a crime and prompt investigation was a matter of practical 
necessity.182 In other words, this case involved no pretext justification 
because the actual motivation was permissible under the law.183 
In Nease v. State, the court stopped signaling favor of the objective 
standard and instead applied the reasonable officer standard.184 The 
reasonable officer standard is defined as whether a reasonable officer 
following normal police practice would have made the seizure in the 
absence of illegitimate motivation.185 In Nease, a Juneau police officer 
was on patrol in the early morning when he observed Nease’s red 
pickup truck parked at a local bar.186 The officer had recently tried to 
make a lawful arrest of the truck’s presumed driver for driving under 
the influence,187 but continued his patrol after seeing the truck at the 
bar.188 One hour later, the officer observed Nease’s pickup truck in the 
parking lot of a nearby restaurant.189 He then saw the truck leave the 
parking lot and pull onto the Glacier Highway.190 The officer began to 
follow Nease.191 The officer observed no problems with Nease’s driving; 
however, when Nease came to a stop, the officer observed that one of 
Nease’s brake lights was not working.192 He stopped Nease and 
determined he was intoxicated.193 Nease successfully moved to suppress 
 
 182.  Id. at 766–67. 
 183.  Id. Similarly, in Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004), 
the defendant argued for the adoption of the subjective standard used in 
Washington state because of Alaska’s heightened constitutional protections. 
However, the court of appeals concluded it was not a pretext stop and there was 
no concern about any ulterior subjective motivations the officer may have had, 
so did not decide the issue. Id. 
 184.  Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1150 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 185.  This is the definition applied in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Desai, 
supra note 6, at 243 (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 186.  Nease, 105 P.3d at 1146. 
 187.  Id. On an earlier occasion, Officer Torok had observed Nease speeding 
75 miles per hour in snowy conditions. Id. When Officer Torok caught up with 
Nease, he was already out of his truck and denied driving. Id. During the stop, 
Officer Torok observed that Nease “could barely walk” and “reeked of alcohol,” 
and he suspected that Nease had been driving while intoxicated. Id. Yet, Nease 
was not arrested because he could not definitively be identified as the driver of 
the vehicle. Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at 1146–47. 
 193.  Id. at 1147. 
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the evidence seized as a result of this stop by arguing the broken brake 
light was a pretext to investigate him for drunk driving.194 The trial 
judge believed he would not have been stopped except for the officer’s 
subjective motivation to investigate the DUI.195 
The State filed a petition for review to the superior court arguing 
that the wrong standard was applied.196 The superior court agreed, 
remanded the case, and directed the district court, quoting Beauvois, to 
determine “whether, under the facts known to the police officer, the stop 
of the car was objectively justified.”197 When the matter came before the 
court of appeals,198 Nease argued that his stop was illegal because it was 
made on subjectively pretextual grounds.199 He argued the officer did 
not stop him for a broken taillight, but rather because he was suspicious 
that Nease might be driving while intoxicated.200 Nease argued that “the 
Alaska Constitution forbids the police from using a traffic infraction as a 
pretext to stop a motorist for an offense for which the police do not have 
enough individualized suspicion to justify a stop.”201 Nease 
acknowledged that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Whren, the officer’s motivations for the stop were considered 
irrelevant.202 But, he argued that the Alaska courts should adopt the 
subjective standard that the Washington Supreme Court did in Ladson.203 
The court of appeals found sufficient evidence in the record that the 
officer had observed a traffic code violation.204 Nease was thus not 
entitled to suppression of evidence even if the traffic violation was a 
pretext for stopping the defendant for driving while intoxicated.205 The 
court again said it was unnecessary to decide whether to adopt the 
standard in Whren or to adopt the standard in Ladson as a matter of state 
law.206 It based this decision on the fact that Nease failed to allege 
sufficient facts to bring the traffic stop within the doctrine of pretext 
stops.207 To explain, the court of appeals turned to a popular treatise on 
 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118, 1121 n.1 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1992)). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. at 1148. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 1150. 
 206.  Id. at 1148. 
 207.  Id. 
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pretext stops to explain that “whether a police officer may have an 
ulterior motive for enforcing the law is irrelevant for Fourth 
Amendment purposes—even under the doctrine of pretext searches—
unless the defendant proves that this ulterior motive prompted the 
officer to depart from reasonable police practices.”208 The court 
subsequently chose to apply the reasonable officer standard.209 
Since Nease, the court of appeals has consistently applied the 
reasonable officer standard in every case involving a question of 
whether an officer engaged in a pretext stop.210 In Olson v. State, for 
example, reasonable police practice is defined broadly.211 After noting 
that, in deciding pretext claims, the reasonable officer standard focuses 
on the issue of whether or not the law enforcement officer departed 
from reasonable police practices, the court found that Olson presented 
“no evidence to suggest that police officers never stop motorists to issue 
citations for equipment violations, or that they would never do so . . . .”212 
It is difficult to imagine any pretext traffic stop that meets this burden, 
and consequently it has nearly the same effect as the objective standard. 
On several occasions criminal defendants have challenged the use 
of pretext stops and urged the Alaska courts to declare that these stops 
violate the Alaska Constitution. By deciding that pretext only occurs 
when the police activity falls outside of common police custom or 
practice—even if the stated reason for the stop was merely used to allow 
investigation into other matters—the court of appeals has shielded 
review of this important issue. While the court may ultimately decide 
that the reasonable officer standard best balances competing interests 
and respects the Alaska Constitution, it has yet to explain its reasoning.  
II. THE REASON FOR PRETEXT IN MODERN POLICING 
To fully understand the best legal standard to apply to pretext 
stops, it is important to consider the purpose of these stops and why 
they are part of established police practice. This section examines how 
the law enforcement system (including the legislative branch, the 
 
 208.  Id. (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4, at 115–25 (3d ed. 1996)). 
 209.  Id. at 1149–50. 
 210.  See Marley v. State, No. A–9285, 2006 WL 1195668, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. 
App. May 3, 2006) (applying the reasonable officer standard); Grohs v. State, 118 
P.3d 1080, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (applying the reasonable officer 
standard); Olson v. State, No. A–8595, 2005 WL 1683588, at *2–3 (Alaska Ct. App. 
July 20, 2005) (applying the reasonable officer standard). 
 211.  Olson, 2005 WL 1683588, at *2–3. 
 212.  Id. at *3 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
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executive branch, and various levels of law enforcement bureaucracy) 
responds to limits placed on its powers to investigate and enforce the 
law.  
Law enforcement officials are closely tied to both political leaders 
who respond to broad-based social demands and to victims of crime 
who make specific pleas for vigorous enforcement. These social and 
political forces cause officers to use creative strategies that reasonably 
bridge the gap between these demands and the strict procedural 
requirements imposed by the courts. One of the major ways in which 
police respond to new legal constraints is to adopt proxy strategies. Very 
basically, officers employ proxy strategies when they use the 
investigation of one crime or activity as an opportunity to investigate 
other crimes unrelated (or only very generally related) to the crime 
under immediate investigation. For example, officers often link 
seemingly benign public activity with more covert crimes, such as 
associating the purchase of diet pills, red phosphorus, and high thread 
count fabrics with the manufacture of methamphetamine. In this 
example, a crime that is difficult to investigate in private spaces is 
replaced with a proxy that routinely occurs in public spaces but which 
may not be illegal absent its connection to an illegal act occurring in 
private spaces.  
Pretext stops are a different form of proxy. This practice is a useful 
law enforcement tool because police can stop and observe suspects that 
they may not have been able to detain absent the observed violation. 
Because of the difficulty of observing many types of criminal activity, 
officers capitalize on opportunities that present themselves to further 
their crime control role in society.  
 While courts are expected to manage an adversarial system in 
consideration of the accused person’s rights, law enforcement routinely 
deals with victims who demand results. On the one hand, law 
enforcement empathizes with the plight of victims. Law enforcement 
may even feel that suspects are behaving in predatory ways, thus 
officers may feel a need to protect potential victims. Officers may feel 
some need to target predators. In any case, victims place direct and 
indirect demands on the law enforcement system. These demands, if 
unfulfilled, often result in appeals to the political system, but may also 
result in appeals to the press. 
It hardly matters whether the press is critical or supportive of law 
enforcement. Positive reports of officers’ attempts to control crime 
probably encourage the law enforcement response, while negative 
reports may result in redoubled efforts to improve public perception. 
There are also periods where the press becomes a direct influence on 
public policy, including severe cases where the press contributes to a 
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moral panic.213 
Thus, in evaluating law enforcement systems, one must consider 
various influences including the macro demands of the political system, 
the micro demands of victims, and the impacts of the press. These 
influences generate significant political pressure on law enforcement 
systems.214  
The “art of policing” is shorthand for the effort of officers and 
others to devise appropriate responses to the competing pressures on 
their job. This “art” incorporates discretion, intuitive investigation, and 
the “spirit of the law” that may be difficult to define and defend solely 
under strict procedural standards. On this view, officers engage in a 
complicated mental exercise that accounts for various social demands 
while also being mindful of reigning legal precedent and potential 
future court decisions. Officers learn to stack layers of reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause, and other intuitive quasi-evidence and to 
anticipate defenses for the investigative acts that they undertake. 
Officers employ complex reasoning that attempts to simultaneously 
access “artistic” processes of policing while also navigating the 
requirements of procedure. 
III.  OBJECTIONS TO PRETEXT 
Two major arguments, often discussed in tandem, against the use 
of pretext stops emerge in the court decisions and other literature on the 
topic.215 First, some argue that pretext stops make it impossible for 
courts to enforce the legal constraints on policing imposed by the Fourth 
Amendment. Second, pretext stops allow officers to conceal evidence of 
impermissible race-based stops. The first argument was raised by the 
defendants in Whren v. United States216 and accepted by the courts in 
State v. Ladson,217 and State v. Ochoa,218 discussed in Section One. Some 
 
 213.  ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 88–108 (2009). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 733 (describing how the 
Fourth Amendment no longer applies while driving a car and how those 
stopped because of race have little recourse). 
 216.  517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“Since, [defendants] contend, the use of 
automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with 
traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost 
invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. This 
creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law 
violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists.”). 
 217.  979 P.2d 833, 838 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]he problem with a 
pretextual traffic stop is that it is a search or seizure which cannot be 
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courts, like the Supreme Court of Washington, find accepting pretext a 
problematic deviation from the bedrock standards set forth in their 
constitutional law that require probable cause and a warrant to search 
and seize individuals unless they fall within a narrow set of 
exceptions.219 This reasoning suggests that police should not do things 
under the guise of fabricated legal justifications if they could not do 
them when acting solely on the basis of their underlying intent.  
This was the historical approach to pretext in New York as well.220 
New York’s pre-Whren decisions applied a series of factors to determine 
the existence of alternative intentions of officers, and, if pretext was 
found, suppress any evidence gathered on this basis.221 Even after 
Whren, some New York courts continued to follow the subjective factors 
approach. One court succinctly explained the problem it saw with 
pretext: 
We also cannot blind ourselves to the dangers inherent in 
according the police the discretion that Whren seems to permit. 
If, in fact, the subjective intent of police officers is not to be 
considered in the face of a credited traffic violation, then we 
have effectively eliminated the decades-old protection against 
stops based upon whim, caprice, idle curiosity, hunch, or gut 
reaction. 
  More troubling still, the inability to look past a proffered 
broken taillight or speed violation precludes exploration of 
malevolent motives, such as stops based upon racial 
 
constitutionally justified for its true reason (i.e., speculative criminal 
investigation), but only for some other reason (i.e., to enforce traffic code) which 
is at once lawfully sufficient but not the real reason. Pretext is therefore a 
triumph of form over substance; a triumph of expediency at the expense of 
reason.”). 
 218.  206 P.3d 143, 149 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (“We are not persuaded that the 
distinction made by the United States Supreme Court is meaningful in the 
context of a pretextual traffic stop. In performing a pretextual traffic stop, a 
police officer is stopping the driver, ‘not to enforce the traffic code, but to 
conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the driving. Therefore the 
reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction has occurred which 
justifies an exception to the warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop 
does not justify a stop for criminal investigation.’ Although there may be a 
technical violation of the traffic law, the true reason for the stop lacks legal 
sufficiency.”) (quoting Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837–38). 
 219.  Ladson, 979 P.2d at 838–39; see supra Section I.B and accompanying 
discussion. 
 220.  Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 734–35. This also was the early 
approach of Alaska. See supra Section I.C.1 and accompanying discussion. 
 221.  Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 7, at 734–38. 
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profiling.222 
The final portion of this quotation suggests a related argument that 
arises in the literature on this topic: the idea that making officers’ 
subjective motivations irrelevant under Fourth Amendment analysis 
prevents courts from detecting and addressing race-based policing.223 
Race-based policing has been the subject of numerous court cases, 
news reports, empirical studies, and legal commentary. As one 
commentator puts the point, “[f]ew issues are more important to 
American policing than race.”224 Race-based policing, often referred to 
as “racial profiling,” is described as a practice whereby officers routinely 
make law enforcement decisions, such as the decision to stop an 
individual, solely on the basis of a citizen’s race or ethnicity.225 “Hard 
profiling” occurs when police use race as the only factor in assessing 
criminal suspiciousness, while “soft profiling” occurs when officers use 
race as one factor among others in determining criminal 
suspiciousness.226 At their core, both definitions hinge upon an officer’s 
prejudicial assumption that members of some racial or ethnic group are 
more likely than others to engage in criminal behavior. Not all uses of 
racial information fall into these definitions. For example, even ardent 
opponents of racial profiling consider it appropriate to use race or 
ethnicity as one of several identifiers of a known suspect to make an 
 
 222.  Id. at 742 (quoting People v. Dickson, 690 N.Y.S.2d 390, 396 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1998)). 
 223.  See Capers, supra note 5, at 12 (“Here, the fact that our current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence now fosters an atmosphere in which racial profiling 
is often unremarkable and juridically tolerated, and in which racial minorities 
perceive themselves to be second-class citizens, evidences the current Court’s 
retreat from concerns about equality and citizenship.”); Abramovsky & 
Edelstein, supra note 7, at 733 (“In practical terms, an officer’s subjective 
motivation in conducting a traffic stop can no longer be the subject of federal 
constitutional inquiry . . . .”); Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 644, 647–48 
(relating contemporary public perceptions of racial profiling in police pretext 
stops in light of Whren and its progeny). See also Desai, supra note 6, at 236 
(noting potentially discriminatory uses of pretextual stops). 
 224.  BRIAN L. WITHROW, THE WICHITA STOP STUDY, Acknowledgements (2002); 
see generally Capers, supra note 5 (discussing how most of our criminal rules of 
procedure have developed out of the need to protect racial minorities from 
abusive processes and the Supreme Court’s concern for equal protection). 
 225.  WITHROW, supra note 226, at 4. See Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 644 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[The U.S. Department of Justice states that] 
racial profiling is any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or 
national origin rather than the behavior of an individual or information that 
leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or 
having been, engaged in criminal activity.”). 
 226.  WITHROW, supra note 226, at 4. 
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enforcement decision regarding that individual.227 
Racial profiling is not merely paranoia or the late penalty flag 
thrown by a guilty defendant; rather, several studies on racial profiling 
indicate minority groups are stopped and searched at 
disproportionately high rates. 228 Researchers analyzing vehicle stop and 
search statistics from the Boston Police Department discovered that 43% 
of all vehicle searches were of black motorists even though they 
comprised only 33% of all the cars stopped by police.229 In four major 
cities in Ohio, statistics showed that blacks were twice as likely to be 
stopped by police as non-blacks.230 Statistics in San Diego, California 
showed black and Hispanic drivers were overrepresented in vehicle 
stops. In that study, blacks were nearly 60% more likely to be stopped 
and Hispanics 37% more likely to be stopped than white drivers.231 A 
report from the Maryland State Police showed that during the period of 
examination blacks comprised 72.9% of the drivers stopped and 
searched along a major interstate although they comprised only 17.5% of 
 
 227.  Id.; see Brian R. Jones, Bias-Based Policing in Vermont, 35 VT. L. REV. 925, 
926–27 (2011) (arguing that the focus is too much on race and not on the root 
problem of “bias-based policing”). 
 228.  See, e.g., Capers, supra note 5, at 14–19 (relating statistical results of 
studies done in Maryland, New York City, and by the ACLU indicating the 
disproportionate frequency and thoroughness of traffic stop and search 
protocols among minorities); Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 644–46 (discussing 
the results of one study where 90% of blacks believed that racial profiling was 
pervasive nationwide, substantiated by a second “windshield study” revealing 
that along the New Jersey Turnpike black motorists constituted 13.5% of all 
drivers, 15% of those exceeding the speed limit, but 46% of those stopped by the 
State Police); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: 
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 
561–63 (1997) (analyzing a case study performed in Florida where minority 
drivers made up 5% of the population commuting on I-95, but represented more 
than 70% of all recorded stops during the study); R. Richard Banks, Beyond 
Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2003) 
(summarizing a multi-jurisdictional study including federal and state law 
enforcement that concluded there is a disproportionate investigation of blacks 
and latinos, even in jurisdictions that prohibit racial profiling); WITHROW, supra 
note 226, at 5–7 (indicating through a conglomeration of studies the heightened 
and disproportionate frequency at which minority drivers are stopped by the 
police); NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., RESULTS OF THE MONITORING OF WSP TRAFFIC 
STOPS FOR BIASED POLICING: ANALYSIS OF WSP STOP, CITATION, SEARCH AND USE OF 
FORCE DATA AND RESULTS OF THE USE OF OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES FOR 
DENOMINATOR ASSESSMENT, 1, 4, 15–16 (2007) (demonstrating that various 
Washington state trooper activities result in a population-proportionate amount 
of self-initiated contact with whites and minorities via collisions, break-downs, 
etc., but, there is a disproportionate number of minorities stopped for 
violations). 
 229.  Birzer & Birzer, supra note 1, at 643. 
 230.  Id. at 643–44. 
 231.  Id. at 644. 
MAY_V14_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/27/2013  2:03 PM 
182 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 30:2 
the drivers violating traffic laws.232 These black motorists were also 
searched more frequently, despite the fact that the rate at which 
contraband was found was statistically identical to that for whites.233  
Statistics reviewed by the ACLU confirm the disproportionate 
impact racial profiling has on law abiding minorities.234 Data collected in 
Los Angeles, California showed that the stop rate was 3,400 stops higher 
per 10,000 residents for blacks than whites, and 350 stops higher for 
Hispanics than whites.235 This data indicated that police were 127% 
more likely to search stopped blacks than stopped whites and 43% more 
likely to search stopped Hispanics than whites.236 Yet, blacks were 
actually 37% less likely to be found with weapons and 23% less likely to 
be found with drugs than whites who were searched.237 Similar numbers 
were found for Hispanics.238 
Researchers note that evidence of disparities along racial or ethnic 
lines does not necessarily offer definitive proof of race-based policing 
because police discretion is complicated, dynamic, and reactive. To 
understand the results of police decisions we must also understand the 
process by which these decisions are made. Few, if any, data sets can 
document this process.239 Legal professionals have been less cautious 
about providing commentary about the cause and effect relationship of 
these numbers and the police discrimination.240 
Regardless of whether police bias against certain groups is real or 
imagined, the perception that police target minorities still persists.241 A 
2009 CNN poll showed that 56% of blacks believe they have been 
treated unfairly by police because of their race and 46% believe that 
police racism against blacks is “very common.”242 Only 11% of whites 
share this same view.243 The recent turmoil regarding Arizona’s attempts 
 
 232.  Capers, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
 233.  Id. at 15. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. at 15–16. 
 239.  WITHROW, supra note 226, at 9. 
 240.  See, e.g., Capers, supra note 5, at 14 (“Here, the numbers are the 
argument.”). 
 241.  See id. at 2 (footnotes omitted) (observing that “[e]ven when racial 
animus is absent, the perception that racial bias is present, or even inevitable 
often persists”). 
 242.  Id. at 14–15. 
 243.  Id. 2013 polling statistics indicate that 61% of blacks surveyed believe the 
U.S. justice system is biased against blacks, 70% believed they are treated less 
fairly by the police, and 68% believed they were treated less fairly by the courts. 
Race and Ethnicity, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/ 
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to pass the anti-illegal immigration Senate Bill 1070 also emphasizes this 
prevailing belief among the Hispanic population. 
Less evident, and perhaps entirely immeasurable, is the role pretext 
stops play in the numbers and perceptions just described. While 
expressly forbidding racially-motivated traffic stops,244 the United States 
Supreme Court’s adoption of the objective standard is believed by some 
to validate “one of the most common methods by which racial profiles 
are put into effect—the pretext stop.”245 It is argued that this validation 
causes a number of harms to minority citizens.246 
Allowing pretext stops makes it extremely difficult for defendants 
to challenge racial profiling in court. There are two primary ways of 
pursuing such a challenge. The first is to argue selective prosecution, a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This requires showing that 
members of the defendant’s racial or ethnic group are unfairly targeted 
by law enforcement by proving systemic profiling through objective 
evidence, such as statistics, that members of other races were not 
prosecuted247 or that members of their racial group are being prosecuted 
disproportionately.248 This argument requires more than just 
highlighting individual instances of racially discriminatory conduct. It 
requires showing patterns of discriminatory conduct. This requirement 
forces defendants to look beyond their own cases to find extensive 
factual evidence.249 Discovery of this type of evidence under applicable 
criminal rules of procedure is extremely limited.250 
The second way of challenging race-based policing is to attack it 
directly as an illegal act of profiling.251 But here, racial profiling is 
defined as an explicit policy of targeting individuals for investigation 
because of their race.252 If a defendant proves the existence of such a 
policy then there is no need to show statistical data showing they are 
members of a group being targeted for enforcement.253 The policy shows 
a direct connection between race and the search or seizure; such a policy 
can only be used if it survives strict scrutiny analysis.254  
Prior to Whren, a defendant claiming racial profiling did so through 
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a hearing.255 During these hearings, defendants could question officers 
about whether the stop arose out of a particularized suspicion or was 
based on pretext alone.256 Establishing pretext was helpful in showing 
that unlawful considerations such as race factored into their decision to 
make the stop.257 If courts adopt Whren’s purely objective standard for 
pretext, an officer’s subjective intentions become irrelevant under Fourth 
Amendment analysis and it prohibits the further questioning needed to 
uproot individual cases of racially-motivated investigations. 
The problems created by profiling are concerning and can be 
exacerbated by the use of pretext. Thus, any decision Alaska makes 
regarding pretext should include a careful review of these concerns and 
how they can be mitigated.  
IV. AN ALASKAN APPROACH 
The time is overdue to explain why Alaska courts follow the 
reasonable officer standard. Alaska courts should articulate how that 
standard will actually work in individual cases and describe how it 
honors Alaska’s constitutional provisions. In developing a standard, 
Alaska courts should look beyond precedent, procedure, and the rule of 
law, and instead incorporate additional perspectives related to the 
benefits of pretext. While jurisprudence often makes precedent, 
procedure, and the rule of law its primary concern, we argue that it 
should incorporate additional perspectives based on police practice. 
Only then can an Alaskan jurisprudence articulate an appropriate legal 
standard consistent with the State’s constitutional protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure.  
The debate about the propriety of pretext stops is part of a much 
larger ethical and philosophical dilemma facing our policymakers and 
courts. As a society, we are constantly struggling to create policies that 
balance the desire to protect the rights of all persons and the need to 
infringe upon those freedoms and liberties to enhance collective public 
safety goals. Some refer to this as a “value tradeoff” wherein society is 
forced to emphasize one at the expense of the other.258 
Irrespective of this need to strike an appropriate balance between 
competing interests in our policies, we also face the harsh reality that we 
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lack the ability to control all the variables leading to disparate 
enforcement. In few areas is this more observable than in our criminal 
justice system. Social factors outside of the system’s control often 
influence who is exposed to governmental observation, apprehension, 
prosecution, and punishment. There are so many variables that 
influence who becomes subject to prosecution that it is difficult to isolate 
any one causal source of the disparate representation we see in our 
statistics.  
We are faced with this reality when we consider pretext. There is 
real doubt that we will ever eradicate the use of pretext motivations 
even if we were to prohibit them. We all make judgments and mental 
shortcuts based on our past experiences and training. If we recognize 
this fact, the question arises whether to prohibit pretext outright and 
push its use further into the shadows or to pursue a policy that identifies 
clear injustices and creates pragmatic solutions.259 As Marx famously 
mused: philosophers interpret the world, but the point is to change it.260 
As we have shown in the first section of this paper, other courts 
across the nation have responded to the challenges of pretext stops with 
a range of “reasonableness standards.” Perhaps in an effort to capture 
universal values, some courts (such as those in Washington) have 
adopted a “subjective standard.” This standard restricts officers’ use of 
pretext stops by emphasizing what the officer intended before the stop. 
If an officer intended to intervene in a dangerous driving incident, the 
stop is allowed; but if the officer uses the same stop as a proxy to 
investigate an unsupported suspicion that another crime might be afoot, 
then the stop is not allowed. This standard seems to signal, even if only 
in perception, that the court is protecting the most vulnerable.  
On the other end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Whren permits the use of pretext stops.261 In Whren, the Court recognized 
that allowing examination of officers’ motives in detaining drivers 
would open courts to an incredible workload and difficult questions.262 
According to the Court, an officer’s subjective motivations are irrelevant 
as long as he could lawfully stop the driver for an observed traffic 
violation.263 The Court concluded that pretext selectively used on certain 
classes can be remedied elsewhere.264  
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Yet, we have described how these other civil remedies are useless 
to most criminal defendants who need a workable opportunity to show 
inappropriate racial motivations in their cases through a suppression 
hearing.265 The objective standard offers the police nearly unchecked 
discretion, and the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards 
relied on by Whren do not limit police from targeting certain types of 
vehicle operators.266 Additionally, under this standard pretext can be 
used to act on unsupported hunches by officers acting outside of 
reasonable police practices. For these reasons, the standard runs afoul of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. The objective standard 
prevents review of many police actions which may offend our notions of 
justice—a review which is at the core of Article I, Section 14.  
The reasonable officer standard strikes the appropriate balance 
regarding competing interests and the realities of police work. Further, it 
is in keeping with the tenets of Alaska’s Constitution. This standard 
permits pretext stops that would have been made regardless of the 
officer’s subjective motivations: for example, where the observed 
violation poses an immediate safety threat or would otherwise require 
immediate action by the officer. These are situations where the observed 
violation poses an immediate safety threat to others or where the 
officer’s typical duties would cause the officer to take immediate action. 
Under this standard, defendants have the opportunity to reveal 
“purely”267 or “classic”268 pretextual fishing expeditions for what they 
are. They can also demonstrate instances where racial profiling is 
motivating the stop without having to point to an official policy or 
amass broader statistical proof. This standard allows judicial review of 
the reasonableness of police seizures, which is the hallmark of Article I, 
Section 14.  
Alaska should continue to use the reasonable officer standard, but 
should adjust its application of this standard to conform to other 
jurisdictions like New Mexico. Alaska has traditionally used the 
standard to decide whether a situation is classified as pretext. If the 
traffic stop was within what would be expected of a reasonable officer in 
that situation, irrespective of the fact that there were other subjective 
motivations that could not have been independently acted upon, then 
the court of appeals has concluded that the stop was not pretext. Other 
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jurisdictions candidly recognize that even in these situations there is an 
element of pretext present, but test to see if it is a type they are willing to 
accept. We urge Alaska to follow their lead. New Mexico has articulated 
an application of the reasonable officer standard that provides a 
workable test.269  
New Mexico determines if a stop is based on pretextual subterfuge 
by considering the totality of the circumstances, judging the credibility 
of the witnesses, weighing the evidence, and excluding evidence if the 
stop constitutes unreasonable pretext.270 The court uses a three part test: 
1. The court decides if there was reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to justify the traffic stop. The state bears this 
burden.  
2. If objectively reasonable on its face, but the defendant 
contends it was pretextual, the court must decide whether the 
officer’s true motivation for the stop differed from the 
objective existence of the traffic violation. Here the defendant 
has the burden of proof to show that under the totality of the 
circumstances pretext motivated the stop. The defendant must 
place substantial facts in dispute that indicate pretext. 
3. If the defendant can establish the presence of a pretext 
motivation for the stop it creates a rebuttable presumption 
that the stop was impermissible pretext. The burden then 
shifts to the state to show that based on the totality of the 
circumstances, even without the unrelated motive, the officer 
would have stopped the defendant for the traffic violation.271  
The court considers a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to the 
burdens required in steps two and three. These include: 
 Whether the defendant was arrested for and charged with a 
crime unrelated to the stop; 
 Whether the officer complied with standard police practices; 
 Whether the officer is in an unmarked patrol car or not in 
uniform; 
 Whether patrolling or enforcement of the traffic code were 
among the officer’s typical employment duties; 
 Whether the officer had information, not rising to the level of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, relating to another 
offense; 
 The manner of the stop; 
 The conduct, demeanor, and statements of the officer during 
the stop; 
 The relevant characteristics of the defendant; 
 Whether the objective reason articulated for the stop was 
necessary to protect traffic safety; and  
 The officer’s testimony as to the reason for the stop.272 
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A standard, applied in this manner, preserves law enforcement’s 
ability to use reasonable proxies in criminal investigation, to candidly 
testify as to the presence of other subjective motivations, and to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of their actions. 
 The only actions prohibited by this approach are those where 
officers are seeking to use minor traffic violations to pursue hunches 
without developed reasonable suspicion and probable cause. In 
addition, this standard reduces the threshold for an individual to raise 
an objection to a pretext stop that might be based upon prohibited 
factors such as race or social classifications.  
 The New Mexico standard, if adopted in Alaska, would enable the 
court to justify the reasonable officer standard in a manner consistent 
with Alaska’s Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Alaska’s appellate courts have been asked on several occasions to 
explain and defend the legalities of pretext stops. We conclude that 
Alaska has informally adopted the correct standard, but urge some 
changes to its application and clarification regarding why it is the best of 
available alternatives. 
This Article provides a review of the standards used, Alaska’s 
historical treatment of pretext, policy, and practice considerations. We 
provide an argument to justify the standard the court is currently using. 
Furthermore, this Article provides arguments that the reasonable officer 
standard balances all competing interests and encourages reasonable 
and practical policing, while protecting the interests of Alaska’s citizens.  
